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We model climate negotiations as a two-stage game. In the first stage of the game, players have to agree on a 
global emission cap (GEC). In the second stage, they non-cooperatively choose either their emission level or their 
emission quota, depending on whether emission trading is allowed, under the cap that potentially binds them 
together. A three heterogenous player quadratic game serves as a base for the analysis. In this framework, when 
the cap is non-binding, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. When the emission cap is binding, among all the 
coupled constraints Nash equilibria, we select a normalized equilibrium by solving a variational inequality, which 
has a unique solution. In both scenarios – with and without emission trading – we show that there exists a non-
empty range of values for which setting a binding cap improves all players’ payoff. It also appears that for some 
values of the cap, all players get a higher payoff under the GEC system alone than under the international cap 
and trade (ITC) system alone. Thus, the introduction of a GEC outperforms the ITC system both in terms of 
emission reduction and of payoff gains. 
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Since more than ﬁfteen years, countries have been engaged in a process of reduction of
Greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions in order to limit the extent of global warming. The ﬁrst step
to the international control of GHG has been reached with the signature of the Kyoto Protocol
(1997). During theses negotiations, individual emission reduction targets, or put diﬀerently
individual emission quotas, have been assigned to 41 developed countries.1 Moreover, the principle
of the international trading of emission permits has been adopted.
In spite of this attempt to solve the climate change problem, it is now clear that countries
have not yet achieved full cooperation toward its resolution. Firstly, one of the two biggest GHG
emitters, the United States, has not ratiﬁed the treaty. The second one, China, was not submitted
to emission reduction during the ﬁrst period of implementation and Russia has ratiﬁed the treaty
at a later date (in 2004). In addition, participating countries have agreed on emission reduction
targets that were far from matching scientiﬁc recommendations, because they were not stringent
enough. More recently, the Copenhagen (2009) submit’s objective was to bring all countries
involved in the climate change problem – including the USA, China and developing countries –
together around a table and to decide on an international timetable for reducing further GHG
emissions during the next decades. But, discussions did not lead to real progress. Actually,
many countries were reluctant to accept individually constraining emission quotas. Nevertheless,
in order to avoid the worst consequences of global warming, it seems that a common view has
emerged about the necessity the limit the rise of temperature to 2 degrees C at the horizon of
2050. In a sense, most countries have then agreed on a global emission reduction eﬀort – or
emission cap – but have failed to decide how to split this global burden among countries.
Motivated by this last observation, this paper raises the question of whether a system that
would consist in setting a global emission cap and letting countries directly choose their emission
levels (under this common constraint) can outperform an international cap and trade system
where countries have to decide on national emission quotas. This question is addressed in a
static game and it is worth mentioning that the environmental game and the subsequent analysis
we develop can also be extended to other environmental issues such as water management and
biodiversity protection.
In the same vein as Helm (2003), we assume that national governments behave non-cooperatively
under any circumstances. Our game has the following features. In each heterogeneous country
(or group of countries), polluting ﬁrms use a technology that involves a single input, namely,
1Targets were deﬁned with respect to the reference year 1990 and had to be reached during the ﬁrst period of
commitment 2008-2012.
2emissions. Emissions generate proﬁts at home but aggregate emissions are a public bad since
they are damaging to all countries. In this context, two general scenarios are envisioned. First,
countries directly choose the amount of emissions (business as usual scenario, BAU). Next, we
assume that an international cap and trade system (ICT), such as the one designed during the
Kyoto protocol, is implemented. This system consists of the choice, by each country, of a national
emission quota and of the possibility to trade emission permits on a competitive market.
Comparing these two scenarios, Helm (2003) ﬁnds ambiguous results both in terms of aggre-
gate emissions and payoﬀs. He notably shows that the ICT system may fail to lower aggregate
GHG emissions (with respect to the BAU scenario). Emission trading creates a new strategic in-
teraction between players that channels through the market. This may translate into an amount
of aggregate emissions higher than emissions released without trading. In this situation, emis-
sions trading may be unanimously preferred by countries because it allows for eﬃciency gains.
In the opposite case, when the ICT succeeds in lowering emissions, some countries may lose from
emission trading and consequently may not approve this system. This paper adds to this analysis
the opportunity for countries – from now on players – to adopt a global emission cap (GEC)
that puts a (potentially binding) ceiling on aggregate emissions. Thus we will have two diﬀerent
regimes in each scenario depending on whether the global cap is binding. Countries can choose
between the two scenarios and between the two regimes.
When the emission cap is binding, there exists in general an inﬁnity of social Nash equilibria
(Debreu, 1952, also called coupled constraints Nash equilibria) which are the solutions of a quasi-
variational inequality (see Baiocchi and Capelo (1984) and, for example, Morgan and Romaniello
(2003) and references therein). We therefore resort to the concept of normalized equilibrium
introduced by Rosen (1965) and proceed to the selection of a particular equilibrium.
For applications of this equilibrium concept to environmental and economic games, see, e.g.,
Haurie and Zaccour (1995), Haurie and Krawczyk (1997), Krawczyk (2000, 2005), Krawczyck and
Uryasev (2000) and Tidball and Zaccour (2008). Our framework is very close to the pollution
control game developed by Tidball and Zaccour (2005), expect that in their model each player
faces an exogenous environmental constraint and they do not consider emission trading. Actually,
their purpose is to compare three scenarios: the Nash equilibrium, the normalized equilibrium
and the cooperative solution. The present work also shares similarities with Drouet et al. (2011)
who introduce a global emission cap in a game of climate negotiations. Our approach is however
diﬀerent because, in their dynamic framework with an exogenous GEC, they use a numerical
approach by implementing an algorithm while we use an analytical approach to compare the
diﬀerent scenarios for a range of values of the cap.
To start with, a general analysis of the normalized equilibrium properties is conducted. We
3are in particular emphasizing the conditions under which this equilibrium exists, is unique and
displays strategies that are continuous with respect to the global emission cap.
Next, we consider a quadratic game with three players. Players diﬀer with respect to both their
environmental concern and their technology. Considering at least three groups of countries allows
us to capture the heterogeneity of countries that participate to international climate negotiations.
The ﬁrst player, who is the most aware about environmental issues and who owns the most eﬃcient
technology, can be identiﬁed as a group of industrialized countries (such as the European Union).
The second player represents a group of developing countries. It is also interesting to introduce a
third group, say United States, who also owns an eﬃcient technology but has low environmental
concern. The ﬁrst part of the analysis is devoted to the calculation of non cooperative solutions in
all scenarios and regimes. When the ceiling is non-binding, the standard case analyzed by Helm
(2003), there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. In the second regime with a binding cap, we
characterize, for any level of the emission cap, the unique normalized equilibrium and individual
payoﬀs can be deﬁned as functions of this cap.
The last part of the paper addresses the issue of the performance, in terms of emission
reduction and payoﬀs, of the international control of emissions. This issue may be broken down
into two diﬀerent but related questions: What is the impact of the introduction of a binding cap
on payoﬀs? What is the most eﬃcient system when countries act non-cooperatively?
Our results can be summarized as follows. Consider this opportunity to move away from
the business-as-usual scenario where countries directly choose their emission levels. Then, two
diﬀerent ways can be followed. On the one hand, countries may adopt a cap and trade system.
In our setting, allowing emission trading has no impact on the amount of aggregate emissions
released in the atmosphere. The aggregate payoﬀ is higher but one player is always worse oﬀ
under the ITC system. Thus, there cannot be an unanimous agreement for the implementation
of the trading system. On the other hand, the opportunity exists to set a global emission ceiling.
This is obviously a means to reduce the amount of aggregate emissions, with respect to the
business-as-usual. The comparison between the two regimes also reveals that for some values of
the cap, all countries gain from the introduction of a binding cap. Finally, our last result provides
strong support for the GEC system alone because we show that some values of the cap exist for
which it outperforms the ITC system alone not only in terms of emission reduction but also in
terms of individual payoﬀs. The GEC system alone can thus be unanimously approved when the
ITC system cannot.
It is worth mentioning that the GEC has the advantage of circumventing the critical question
of how the initial allocation of permits between countries should be determined (this diﬃculty
explaining why international negotiations fail to achieve an eﬃcient agreement) because countries
4only need to agree with each other on the global emission ceiling to be imposed. They do not
have to engage in binding individual quota and can choose freely their emission level under the
constraint imposed (but accepted) by the ceiling. This clearly echoes what has been observed in
Copenhagen.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, deﬁnes the solution concept
used for the analysis and investigates properties of existence and uniqueness of the normalized
equilibrium. Section 3 considers a quadratic game and provides a characterization of the equi-
librium, in all scenarios. In section 4, a comparison between scenarios and regimes is conducted,
particular attention being paid to players’ payoﬀs in each possible situation. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
To model climate change negotiations, a two-stage game is developed. In stage 1, players
agree on a global emission cap.2 In stage 2, two scenarios are envisioned depending on whether
the trading of emissions is allowed. Either players choose non-cooperatively their emission levels
under the constraint set by the cap. Or, still submitted to the constraint, they decide on their
emission allowances and ﬁrms can trade emissions permits on an international market.
Let N be the set of players, each indexed by i = 1;:::;n. Emissions of player i, that are denoted
by ei  0, are a by-product of production, with a one-to-one relationship. Player i’s individual
payoﬀ is the sum of two components: a beneﬁt from individual emissions, i(ei) and a “subjective”
damage from aggregate emissions, i(e) with e =
n P
i=1
ei. The latter function reﬂects more than a
real environmental damage incurred by a country. It also encompasses an environmental concern,
or awareness, dimension. Actually, it is clear that consequences of climate change will mainly be
a matter for future generations. So, what countries reveal in actual climate negotiations is where
they have put the balance between economic and environmental targets. By convention, in the
remainder of the analysis, for any e, the player with the highest i(e) will be identiﬁed as the one
who cares the most about the environment.
We deﬁne as  > 0 the global emission cap all players agree on. This GEC is a coupled




ei   (1)
2The minimum requirement for this kind of agreement to emerge is that individual’s payoﬀs under the cap are
higher than what they can obtain in the business-as-usual. This will be the purpose of section 5 to determine
under which conditions this can arise.
5Denote the vector of emissions by  e = (e1;:::;ei;:::;en) and the constraint set by:




ei  g; (2)
Finally denote




2.1 First scenario: without emission trading
In the ﬁrst scenario, players directly choose their emission level under the constraint  e 2 E().
Player i’s individual payoﬀ is simply given by:
Wi( e) = i(ei)   i(e): (3)
Since the GEC implies a joint (coupled) constraint on the strategy spaces of all players, one
has to look at social Nash equilibria (Debreu, 1952).
We will say that a vector  e() 2 E() is a social Nash equilibrium of the pseudogame  () =
f(Wi)i2N;E()g, associated with the payoﬀ Wi;i 2 N, and with the set E(), if:
For all i 2 N; Wi( e())  Wi(ei;  e i()) for all ei 2 R such that (ei;  e i()) 2 E() (4)
Under some conditions, solving (4) is equivalent to solving a quasi-variational inequality (see
Baiocchi and Capelo (1984) and, for example, Morgan and Romaniello (2003)) that has, in
general, an inﬁnite number of solutions. Selecting a normalized equilibrium, as introduced by
Rosen (1965), we will have only to solve a variational inequality having a unique solution under
appropriate conditions which will be satisﬁed by the class of quadratic games considered in Section




vector  r = (r1;:::;rn) yields the weights attributed to all countries by a legislator (see Krawczyk,
2005, for a detailed interpretation of these weights). In the subsequent analysis, we will put all
these weights equal to one, which implies that the joint payoﬀ function simply corresponds to the
aggregate payoﬀ. It can be seen as a natural candidate for being the objective to follow in stage
1 of the game because it boils down to considering that all players involved in the negotiations
are treated equally.
Deﬁnition 1 A vector  eR() 2 E() is a selected normalized equilibrium (in short: normalized







 i()) for all  e 2 E(): (5)
6The equilibrium concept of interest being deﬁned, a series of questions naturally arise regard-
ing:
1. The existence of a normalized equilibrium for the pseudogame  ();
2. The uniqueness of the normalized equilibrium;
3. The continuity, with respect to , of the vector equilibrium and of the payoﬀs at the
equilibrium.
The following results can be stated3
Theorem 1 If i and i are continuous function on R+ and, for all  u 2 Rn
+, the function F u
deﬁned by F u( e) =
n P
i=1
i(ei)   i (ei + u i) is quasiconcave on Rn
+, then, for all  > 0, there
exists at least a normalized equilibrium of the pseudogame  ().
Proof. See the appendix A.
In addition, we obtain that
Corollary 1 If, for all i 2 N, i is concave and i is convex, then, for all  > 0, there exists a
normalized Nash equilibrium of the pseudogame  ().
Regarding the issue of uniqueness, we use the equivalence between the normalized equilibrium
and the solution of a variational inequality. Indeed, a vector  eR() is a selected normalized
equilibrium of the pseudogame  () if and only if it solves the following variational inequality:


G( eR());  eR()    e

 0; for all  e 2 E() (6)
where G(:) is deﬁned, for all  e 2 E(), by:
G( e) =
8
> > > > > > <







> > > > > > =
> > > > > > ;
3Proofs, when too long, are relegated to the appendix.
7We know, from Rosen (1965), that the normalized equilibria deﬁned above is unique if the operator
 G is strictly monotone that is
hG( e)   G(  f);  e    fi < 0 for all  e;  f 2 Rn:
Note that in the framework presented in section 2.3 and analyzed in the subsequent sections, the
operator  G is strictly monotone so the selected normalized equilibria deﬁned by condition (5)
will be unique.
Assume that there exists a unique normalized equilibrium denoted  eR().
Theorem 2 If the functions i and i are continuous on R+ then  eR() depends continuously
on  on R+.
Proof. See the appendix B.
Finally, we obviously have:
Theorem 3 If the functions i and i are continuous on R+ then WR
i () = Wi( eR()) depends
continuously on  on R+.
2.2 Second scenario: with emission trading
In the second scenario, there exists a market for the trading of emission permits. Players now
choose their emission allowance, !i  0, still under the coupled constraint ! =
n P
i=1
!i  . This
allowance represents the amount of permits given to the representative ﬁrm. Representative ﬁrms
of each country are competitive and can trade permits with each other. In this second scenario,
there is a third stage where the representative ﬁrm, in each country, chooses the emission level
that maximizes proﬁts, taking the market price p and the allowance of permits as given:
max
ei
i(ei) + p(!i   ei)
Assuming that i is suﬃciently smooth for all i, then solutions of this problem ei(p) satisfy
0
i(ei) = p for all i: ﬁrms equalize the marginal beneﬁt from emission to the marginal cost, which
is simply given by the price. These solutions, together with  e(p) are uniquely deﬁned for any
market price p and continuous with respect to p. Using the market clearing condition, e = !, we
obtain the unique equilibrium price: p = p(!). Replacing p by this expression in the one of the
emission level, the latter can be expressed as a function of the aggregate allowance ei = ei(!)
and both the equilibrium price and emission levels are continuous with respect to !. Finally,
8the player’s individual payoﬀ in this second scenario can be written in terms of the allowance
strategies
Vi( !) = i(ei(!)) + p(!)(!i   ei(!))   i(!);
which means that players, or governments, cares about how the market equilibrium changes in
response to their strategies.
Therefore, the individual payoﬀ of player i, Vi(  w), is a continuous function of  !, which
means that our analysis of the normalized equilibrium properties (existence, uniqueness and
continuity of the normalized equilibrium and of the aggregate value with respect to ), following
the introduction of a GEC, can be extended to this second scenario.
The next section introduces a simple three-player quadratic game that will serve as a basis
for our analyis.4
2.3 The three-player quadratic game
For both scenarios, the two possible problems, depending on whether the emission cap is
binding, are addressed. When the emission cap is non-binding, the strategy spaces of players are
independent and we are solving for the Nash equilibrium of the game. In the opposite case (the
GEC is binding), we turn to the concept of normalized equilibrium.
Within the quadratic game, beneﬁts express as a function of the emission level: i(ei) = ei(i 
ei). This is a typical representation of the proﬁt functional, with i > 0 the exogenous market
price of the commodity and a convex production cost. Each player involved in the negotiation







ei and i  0. Thus,





In our leading example, we introduce a rough distinction between players in order to account
for the diﬀerent groups of countries involved in climate negotiations. This distinction is done
with respect to the technology the players own and to their environmental concern:
 Player 1 represents high productivity - high concern countries (for example, Europe),
 Player 2 is a group of high productivity - low concern countries (for example, USA and
Russia),
4Note that our analysis can be extended to a larger number of countries but, for tractability purposes, we
concentrate on this situation.
9 Player 3 corresponds to low productivity - low concern countries (developing countries).
This boils down to assuming that:
1 = 2 > 3 and 1 > 2 = 3: (8)
3 Non-binding GEC: Nash equilibrium
Let us start with the analysis of the standard case where players are not submitted to the coupled
constraint. This case has been extensively studied by Helm (2003). Thus, in this section, we
merely report the solutions for our particular example and brieﬂy discuss the impact of emission
trading on both emissions levels and payoﬀs. This benchmark is a prerequisite of the original
part of our analysis, which will extend the study to the case where a binding GEC is introduced.
3.1 Choice of emission levels
First, we consider the situation where players directly choose their emission levels. At a Nash









The unique solution (expressions are symmetric for players  i) reads:
eN
i =
i(2 +  i)   i i
2(2 + i +  i)
(9)
Non-negativity of emissions, eN






for i = 1;2;3 (10)
these conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of a unique non-negative Nash
equilibrium. At the Nash equilibrium, each player equalizes the marginal beneﬁt from emissions
to the marginal damage. This implies that the second player chooses a level of emissions which
is higher than the one chosen by player 1 (that is more concerned with the environment) and by
player 3 (that owns a less eﬃcient technology). From now on, we assume that
1 < 1 + 3; (11)
which is suﬃcient for having eN
1 > 0 and thus eN
2 > 0. Assumption (11) states that environmental
concerns do not diﬀer to much between countries. It will, in addition, greatly simplify the analysis
of the normalized equilibrium.
103.2 Choice of emission allowances
In the situation where emission trading is allowed between ﬁrms, players, say governments,
have now to choose the emission allowance !i that is given for free to ﬁrms. Players take into
account the impact of their choice on the equilibrium of the market of emission permits. In
this second scenario, the representative ﬁrm, in each country, chooses the emission level that
maximizes proﬁts, taking the market price p and the allowance of permits as given:
max
ei
ei(i   ei) + p(!i   ei)
At this stage, we do not incorporate the non-negativity constraint on ei. We will a posteriori




for i = 1;2;3: (12)




(i +  i   2!):






(2i    i + 2!) (13)
In our leading example, emission levels are positive for players 1 and 2 (the ones who own the
most productive technology, the only thing that matters in determining ﬁrms’ choices) whereas





(2i    i + 2!)(4i +  i   2!) +
1
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At the Nash equilibrium, player i chooses !i that maximizes (14) given !N
 i. One obtains the
unique Nash equilibrium in allowance strategies:
!N
i =
i(6 + 5 i   4i) +  i(2 i   7i)
6(2 + i +  i)
(15)
The non-negativity condition, !N
i  0, can be rewritten as:
i(6 + 5 i   4i)   i(7i   2 i) for i = 1;2;3; (16)
11this condition is satisﬁed for player 2, it is supposed to hold for players 1 and 3. We ﬁnally
have to check that the emission level of player 3, obtained by replacing ! with !N in (13), is
non-negative. Emissions of player 3 are non-negative if and only if:





3 + 1 + 23
(17)
The next section proceeds to the comparison of the Nash equilibria obtained in the two
scenarios. Particular emphasis is placed on the impact of emission trading on emission strategies,
aggregate emissions and payoﬀs.
3.3 Impact of emission trading on emission levels and payoﬀs
The comparison between emission and allowance strategies and the position of any player on the
market are entirely determined by the damage component of payoﬀs.
Proposition 1 In the three player quadratic game,
i/ The high concern player is a permit buyer and low concern players are permit sellers.
ii/ The high concern player chooses an emission allowance that is lower than the emission
level chosen in the absence of trading whereas low concern players’ allowances are higher.
Proof. Follows directly from the comparison between i/ (13) and (15) and ii/ (9) and (15).
Indeed, !N
i < e
i(!N) ,  i   2i < 0 and !N
i < eN
i ,  i   2i < 0. The same inequality is
involved in the two comparisons. Under assumption (8), this inequality is satisﬁed for player 1
whereas the converse holds for players 2 and 3.
The interpretation of this result can be found in Helm (2003). To sum up, if a low concern
player were to increase its emission allowance, respectively its emission level, its marginal beneﬁt
would decrease less rapidly with emission trading. The marginal beneﬁt with trading is given by
the permit price p(!) whereas it is simply given by 0
i(ei) in the absence of trading and one can
easily check that p0
(!) =  2
3 > 00
i (ei) =  1. This is due to the fact that an additional unit of
!i increases the demand of permits e
i(!) but in a proportion which is less than one because part
of this increase is picked up by other players. This is an incentive, for a low concern player, to
increase its emission allowance with respect to its emission level. A symmetric reasoning applies
to the high concern player.
Regarding the comparison between aggregate emissions, direct calculations yield
eN = !N =
i +  i
2 + i +  i
; (18)
12which means that the sum of allowances chosen at the Nash equilibrium, which also yields the
aggregate emission level, is the same as the sum of emissions at the Nash equilibrium without
emission trading. This is consistent with Helm (2003) who deﬁnes the hypothetical scenario
where !i = eN
i and shows that the diﬀerence between aggregate emissions is determined by
the diﬀerence between aggregate marginal beneﬁts obtained in the Nash equilibrium and in the






i )) S 0. In our quadratic game, in
which second order technological eﬀects are absent ("(ei) =  1 for all i), the latter diﬀerence is
nil. This means that emission trading has no impact of the amount of emissions released in the
atmosphere.
If emission trading does not aﬀect emissions, one obviously expects that it translates into
eﬃciency gains.
Proposition 2 Emission trading increases the aggregate payoﬀ. As far as individual payoﬀs are
concerned, the high (respectively low) concern player(s)’s payoﬀ is lower (respectively higher) with
emission trading.
Proof. One obtains the Nash equilibrium payoﬀs in the two scenarios, WN
i and V N
i , by sub-
stituting respectively the solutions (9) and (15) in (7) and (14). Then, one can verify that
WN
i < V N
i ,  2( i 2i)2 < 4( i 2i)(i+ i 2). Under assumption (8), this inequal-
ity is satisﬁed for players 2 and 3 but not for player 1. In addition, WN =
P
WN





The international cap and trade system thus outperforms the regime where players directly
choose their emission levels from an aggregate perspective. However, the high concern country
loses from the trading of emission permits, which clearly poses the question of the acceptability
of such a system. Indeed, since one player is worse oﬀ under emission trading, one expects, in
the absence of other mechanisms like international transfers, that no unanimous agreement will
emerge from any negotiations intended to promote this system (see Helm, 2003).
The purpose of the next sections is to investigate whether the simpler system consisting of
choosing a binding cap may be i/ better, in terms of both emissions and payoﬀs, than the interna-
tional cap and trade and thus ii/ approved by all the countries involved in climate negotiations.
Let us denote the amount of aggregate emissions released in each scenario (18) by  . As
long as the global emission cap is set to a level    , this constraint is not binding that is, the
solutions above prevails. But, once this cap is ﬁxed to a level strictly below  , it plays a role
by forcing countries, when choosing ei or !i, to respect it. When the coupled constraint binds
players together, we turn to the analysis of the normalized equilibrium.
134 Binding GEC: Normalized equilibrium
4.1 Choice of emission levels
The normalized equilibrium, introduced by Rosen (1965), is indexed by R. Assume that
eR = , eR






i   ei)  0
for all  e such that ei + e i   and ei;e i  0:
(19)
Consider  e such that ei + e i =  , eR
 i   e i =  (eR
i   ei) and use this relation to remove
e2 and eR
2 from the variational inequality, then:: 5
P
i6=2(i   2 + (2 + 2   i)   4eR
i   2eR
 in2)(eR
i   ei)  0
for all  e such that ei + e i =  and ei;e i  0
(20)
If the equation i   2 + (2 + 2   i)   4eR
i   2eR
 in2 = 0 holds for i = 1;3, then using the
feature that eR
2 =    eR
 2, one gets the interior solution
eR
i () = ei() =
2i    i + (2(1   i) +  i)
6
for all i = 1;2;3 (21)
Otherwise, it is possible to obtain corner solutions with eR
i () = 0 or eR
i () = . Note that,
by deﬁnition, e2() 2 [0;] when e1() and e3() also lie in the interval [0;]. From assumption
(11), one can easily check that e1()  0 and e3()   for all  2 (0;  ]. Deﬁne two boundaries
^  and ~  as:
^  =
3   1
2( 2 + 3   1)
(, e1() = ) and ~  =
2(1   3)
2 + 1   3
(, e3() = 0);
these boundaries satisfy: 0 < ^ w < ~ w <  . The normalized equilibrium strategies are given by
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
(0; ^ ) (^ ; ~ ) (~ ;  ]
eR
1 () =  eR
1 () = e1() eR
1 () = e1()
eR
2 () = 0 eR
2 () =    e1() eR
2 () = e2()
eR
3 () = 0 eR
3 () = 0 eR
3 () = e3()
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
(22)
In our example, assuming (11) is satisﬁed, one observes that for a low enough , the high
concern - high productivity player is the only one with positive emissions. Actually, it rejects
the total amount of allowed emissions. The second intermediate player starts emitting for higher
5Denoting by e
R
 in2 the strategy of player other than i and 2.
14values of the GEC, its emissions being given by the diﬀerence between  and the emissions of
player 1. Finally, when the GEC is set to a suﬃciently high level, the three players have a positive
level of emission given by the interior solution ei().
In addition, focusing on the interval (~ ;  ] such that all players release positive emissions,
the impact of the introduction of the cap on emission levels is crystal-clear. When submitted
to a binding GEC, all players reduce their emission levels: eR
i () < eN
i for all  2 (~ ;  ) and
for i = 1;2;3. In addition, emissions are continuous at the critical level  : eR
i ( ) = eN
i for
i = 1;2;3.6 Looking at emission levels under the binding regime also reveals that player 2 still
chooses the highest amount of emissions and the ranking between emissions of player 1 and player
3 remains ambiguous. As an illustration of how emission levels change in response to changes in
, see ﬁgure 1.7
Figure 1: Emission levels, with and without a binding cap.
4.2 Choice of emission allowances
When the emission cap is chosen below  , the solution (15) is no longer valid and we have to
compute the normalized equilibrium. Note that the relevant domain of variation of  is now
6Note that emissions are also continuous at the critical boundaries ^  and ~ .
7The set of baseline parameters used to illustrate the case without emission trading is: 1 = 2 = 2, 3 = 1,
1 = 1 and 2 = 3 = 0:5 (the values satisfy assumption (10) and (11)).
15[;  ] with  = 1   3. Considering again that !R =  and following the same approach as in
section 4.1, if  !R is the selected normalized equilibrium then:
P
i6=2(i   2 + (2 + 32   3i)   4wR
i   2wR
 in2)(wR
i   wi)  0
for all  w such that wi + w i =  and wi;w i  0:
(23)
Suppose equation i   2 + (2 + 32   3i)   4wR
i   2wR
 in2 = 0 holds for i = 1;3. Then
using the feature that !R




2i    i + (2 + 3 i   6i)
6
for i = 1;2;3 (24)
Since for any  2 [;  ], !R
i () 2 (0;) for all i, these strategies are those chosen by players
at the normalized equilibrium.
On the domain of deﬁnition of the GEC, [;  ], all players produce and create emissions as a
by-product. It is straightforward to check that setting a binding cap forces all players to reduce
their allowances that is, !R
i () < !N
i for all [;  ] for i = 1;2;3. As in the ﬁrst scenario, we also
observe that allowances and emissions are continuous at  . So, these properties hold regardless
of whether emission trading is possible. Player 2 chooses the highest allowance, even when the
quota is binding. Figure 2 depicts the evolution of allowances and emissions when the GEC is
moving in [;  ].8 We can observe that the allowance chosen by player 1 is relatively insensitive
to the value of the GEC and very close to the allowance strategy at the Nash equilibrium. For
low concern players, the allowance strongly changes in response to change in . In addition, the
lower , the larger the diﬀerence between Nash and normalized equilibrium allowances.
5 International control of emissions: what is the best regime?
As far as the international control of pollution is concerned, four diﬀerent situations can be
discussed within our simple framework. These situations diﬀer with respect to ﬁrst the scenario
– with or without emission trading – and second, the regime – with or without a binding GEC.
Our aim, in this section, is to examine the diﬀerent combination of scenarios and regimes, with
particular attention being paid to i/ the impact of the introduction of a binding cap on payoﬀs in
each scenario and ii/ the comparison of the performance of the GEC system alone and the ITC
8Figures provided for the case with emission trading and for the comparison between the two scenarios have
been done using: 1 = 2 = 1:5, 3 = 1, 1 = 6=7 and 2 = 3 = 4=7 (theses values are consistent with the
non-negativity conditions).
16Figure 2: Right: Emission allowances, with and without a binding cap, Left: emission levels
system alone. The GEC system alone has to be understood as the system that consists of the
direct choice of emission levels under the coupled constraint (analyzed in section 4.1) whereas the
ITC system alone refers to the situation where players choose their emission allowances and are
not submitted to a global cap (studied in section 3.2).
Before going any further, recall that part of the task has already been done in section 3.3,
where we compared the two usual situations found in the literature: direct choice of emission
against choice of emission allowances. This comparison was a means to emphasize the impact
of emission trading on both players’ strategies and payoﬀs. This analysis was conducted in the
ﬁrst regime without any binding cap. However, it turns out that all the results we obtained for
Nash equilibria (see propositions 1 and 2) can be extended to normalized equilibria. For any cap
chosen in [;  ]9 the high concern - high productivity player is still the one who buys emission
permits and chooses an emission allowance lower than the level of emission he would have chosen
in the absence of trading. By contrast, the low concern players sell permits on the market and
increase their emissions, when they are tradable. Regarding the impact of emission trading on
payoﬀs, when players face the coupled constraint, one can also easily verify that for any  2 [;  ],
emission trading decreases country 1’s payoﬀs and increases the payoﬀs of country 2 and 3, the
overall impact being again positive. Therefore, it appears that the introduction of a binding cap
9This is the relevant interval for the comparison between normalized equilibria with and without emission
trading because both solutions exist for any  picked up in this interval. In addition,  > ~  which implies that
all players release positive emissions in both scenarios.
17does not aﬀect the analysis of the eﬀect of trading, as discussed in section 3.3.
In the following section, we address the question of how choosing the global emission cap,
corresponding to stage 1 of the game.
5.1 Binding vs. non-binding GEC: comparison between payoﬀs
We do not necessarily seek to determine which cap maximizes a given objective, for instance
the unweighted sum of individual payoﬀs. Rather, we are wondering – in both scenarios – whether
setting a binding GEC can be proﬁtable to all players. This is the minimum requirement for an
agreement to emerge in stage 1 of the game.
We are looking for the conditions under which no player incurs losses from the introduction of
a cap. The analysis relies on a comparison between payoﬀs attained at the normalized equilibrium,
these payoﬀs being dependent on the endogenous cap, and the payoﬀs of the Nash equilibrium
with a non-binding cap. Expressions of individual payoﬀs in all scenarios are needed.
Using the property that strategies, and consequently individual payoﬀs, are continuous at the
critical bound  , eR
i ( ) = eN
i and !R
i ( ) = !N
i , one obtains, for the case where players directly










i ( ) = WN
i and expressions are symmetric for players  i.
In the second scenario with trading, the expression of country i’s payoﬀ (expressions being





((4i +  i   2)(2i    i + 2)) +
1
6





i ( ) = V N
i .
Given these expressions, the following result can be established.
Proposition 3 Regardless of the possibility of trading emission permits, there exists a non empty
set of values of  such that imposing a binding emission cap is beneﬁcial to all players.
Proof. The proof is similar in both scenarios, it uses the features of the value function in the
neighborhood of the critical bound  .
i/ For the sake of simplicity, in the ﬁrst scenario without trading, attention is paid to the
interval [~ w;  ]. Properties of WR
i (): (WR






i <   ,   i + 2i + 4 > 0, which holds under assumptions (8) and (11) for all
18i. The function WR
i () is decreasing in the neighborhood of   and, since it is continuous at  ,
9Ii  [~ w;  ] such that 8 2 Ii, WR
i ()  WN
i . This feature holds for i = 1;2;3. Finally notice
that \Ii 6= .
ii/ From the properties of V R
i (), we obtain (V R






i <  (, 4 + 3(2i    i) > 0) under (8) and (11). The function V R
i () is decreasing in
the neighborhood of   and continuous at  , thus there exists an interval Ji  [;  ] such that
8 2 Ji, V R
i ()  V N
i , for all i. Finally one has \Ji 6= , which completes the proof.
Therefore, it is possible to choose the cap in such a way that the three players, regardless
of their particular environmental concern and/or technology, ﬁnd it worthwhile to be submitted
to the coupled constraint. In other words, controlling world emissions thanks to the emission
cap, provided that it is appropriately chosen, is better than letting countries directly choose their
emission level provided that they behave strategically. Figure 3 depicts the evolution of players’
payoﬀs as a function of the cap. In this particular example, we even see that player 1 and 3 are
always better oﬀ under the binding cap regime whereas the cap has to be high enough in order
for player 2 to gain from its introduction.
The same result holds when players now non-cooperatively choose emission allowances and
their representative ﬁrms are allowed to trade permits with each other. In some cases, like the
one illustrated in ﬁgure 4, all players gain from the introduction of a binding GEC, whatever the
level at which it is ﬁxed.
Figure 3: Individuals and aggregate payoﬀs: binding vs. non-binding
19Figure 4: Individuals and aggregate payoﬀs: binding vs. non-binding
5.2 GEC vs. ITC: what is the best regime?
We now address the central question raised by the present analysis: Is it better to control
GHG emissions thanks to a system of individual emission quotas and emission trading or to set
a global emission cap and let countries decide their emission level?
We already know that, for any , the high concern - high productivity player earns the highest
payoﬀ in the ﬁrst scenario without emission trading. In addition, the last proposition states that
there exists some values of the GEC for which, in the ﬁrst scenario, setting a binding cap increases
his payoﬀ. Thus, it is clear that one can ﬁnd values of  such that this player will prefer the
GEC system alone rather than the ITC system alone. The comparison is not so easy for players
2 and 3 because, in contrast with player 1, they ﬁnd it proﬁtable to be allowed to trade emission
permits.
To answer this question, let us compare, for these two players, the payoﬀ obtained at the Nash
equilibrium, with emission trading, V N
i = V R
i ( ), with the payoﬀ at the normalized equilibrium,
in the absence of trading, WR
i (). The following result can be stated.
Proposition 4 Suppose
92
i ( i   2i   4)2
(2 +  i   2i)2 + 18i
> ( i   2i)(5 i + 2i) (27)
Then, there exists a subset of [;  ] such that individual payoﬀs under the global emission cap
regime are higher than the payoﬀs obtained in the international cap and trade system.
20Proof. Let us ﬁrst compute the diﬀerence between the maximum possible payoﬀ under the GEC
alone, WR
i (W




i )   WR
i ( ) =
92
i ( i   2i   4)2
36((2 +  i   2i)2 + 18i)
 2 > 0 (28)
Next, compute the diﬀerence between the Nash equilibrium payoﬀs, in the two scenarios
V R
i ( )   WR
i ( ) =
( i   2i)(5 i + 2i)
36
 2 > 0 (29)
To complete the proof, it is suﬃcient to impose WR
i (W
i ) > V R
i ( ) which is equivalent to (27).
This implies that there exist values of  such that players 2 and 3 are better oﬀ under the GEC
system alone.
We are now able to summarize our ﬁndings. Consider this opportunity to move away from the
business-as-usual scenario where countries directly and non-cooperatively choose their emission
levels. Then, two diﬀerent ways can be followed. On the one hand, the case usually considered
in the literature is the one where countries may adopt a cap and trade system. In our setting,
allowing emission trading has no impact on the amount of aggregate emissions released in the
atmosphere. We also show that if the ITC is accompanied by higher aggregate payoﬀ, one player
is always worse oﬀ with emission trading. Thus, he will logically not approved any agreement
that would crown the trading system. On the other hand, the opportunity exists to set a global
emission ceiling, in the case where countries directly choose their emission levels. This is obviously
a means to reduce the amount of aggregate emissions, with respect to the business-as-usual. The
comparison between the two regimes also reveals that for some values of the cap, all countries
gain from the introduction of a binding cap. Finally, our last result provides strong support
for the GEC system alone because we show that some values of the GEC exist for which it
outperforms the ITC system alone not only in terms of emission reduction but also in terms of
individual payoﬀs. The GEC system alone can thus be unanimously approved when the ITC
system cannot. Our numerical example illustrates the existence of a non empty set for the GEC
such that for any  picked up in this set, all players are better oﬀ under the GEC system alone
(see ﬁgure 5).
6 Conclusion
We model climate change negotiations as a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, players have to
agree on a global emission cap (GEC). In the second stage, they non cooperatively choose either
21their emission level or their emission quota, depending on whether emission trading is allowed,
under the cap that potentially binds them together. When the cap is non-binding, there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium. When the emission cap is binding, we select a normalized equilibrium
by solving a variational inequality with a unique solution. In both cases (with or without emission
trading), we show that there exists a non-empty range of values for which setting a binding cap
improves all players’ payoﬀ. We also show that for some values of the cap, all players get a higher
payoﬀ under the GEC system alone than under the international cap and trade (ITC) system
alone whereas overall emissions are reduced. Thus, the introduction of a GEC outperforms the
ITC system both in terms of emission reduction and of payoﬀ gains.
From a policy perspective, the GEC system, by opposition to the ITC system, presents the
advantage of circumventing the critical question of how the initial allocation of permits between
countries should be determined. However, this system raises another diﬃculty regarding how to
choose the weights, often interpreted as negotiation powers, attributed to the players in Rosen’s
formalism. In any event, the following argument provides strong support for the introduction of
a GEC. As mentioned by Helm (2003), in general the ITC system cannot at the same time lead
to less pollution and be unanimously approved by all the countries involved in the negotiations.
The GEC system does not suﬀer from this weakness because both goals can be simultaneously
met by appropriately choosing the cap.
An incoming development of this work consists in extending the analysis to the case of dis-
continuous damages. Indeed, there is a growing evidence of the existence of thresholds levels
of GHG concentrations beyond which catastrophic and irreversible events may occur. Within
our static framework, this would induce us to consider critical emission levels at which damages
jump upward. These levels should be diﬀerent among players since countries are not equally
exposed to the consequences of global warming. Another natural extension of this analysis is to
account for the intertemporal dimension of the climate change problem that is due to the stock
pollutant nature of GHG. This can be done by assessing the issue raised by the present paper in
a diﬀerential game.
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Figure 5: Comparison between payoﬀs: International cap and trade vs. global emission cap







2 E() is a selected normalized equilibrium for the pseudogame  ()
if and only if:
n X
i=1





that is, if and only if:  eR() is a ﬁxed point of the set-valued function L deﬁned on E() by:
 u = (u1;:::;un) 2 E()  ! L( u) = ArgMax e2E()
n X
i=1
Wi (ei;  u i): (31)
For  > 0, E() and L satisfy the assumptions of Kakutani’s theorem which garantees the
existence of such a ﬁxed point.
In fact:
1. E() is a nonempty, convex and compact subset of Rn;
2. L has closed graph;
3. L( u) is a nonempty and convex subset of E() for all  u 2 E():
1. The ﬁrst point is obvious.
2. Let us show that, for all  > 0, L has a closed graph over E().
Let (u1;k;:::;un;k)k2N be a sequence such that  uk = (u1;k;:::;un;k) 2 E() for all k 2 N
and such that  uk converges to  u in E() as k ! 1. Then, for all i 2 N;ui;k converges to
ui as k ! 1 and, since E() is a closed set,  u = (u1;:::;un) 2 E().
Moreover, let (eR
1;k;:::;eR




n;k) converges to  eR = (eR
1 ;:::;eR
n) ask ! 1 and (32)
 eR
k 2 L( uk); for all k 2 N: (33)
Then, for all i 2 N, eR
i;k converges to eR
i as k ! 1.
One has to prove that (eR
1 ;::: ;eR
n) 2 L(u1;::: ;un), that is:
 eR = (eR
1 ;::: ;eR
n) 2 E() and (34)




i ;  u i) 
n X
i=1
Wi(ei;  u i) (35)
26Due to (32) and (33), we obtain condition (34) using a limit process.








The function Wi is continuous on Rn




















i (ei;  u i) (36)
This is true for all  e = (e1;::: ;en) 2 E(). Therefore L has closed graph over E().
3. For all  u 2 E();L( u) is a nonempty set since E() is compact and, for all i 2 N, the
function Wi is continuous Rn
+.
For all  u 2 E();L( u) is a convex set since the function deﬁned by F u( e) =
Pn
i=1 Wi (ei;  u i)
is assumed to be quasiconcave.
B Continuity with respect to  of the normalized equilibrium and
the aggregate value at the equilibrium
Let  > 0 and k 2 R+ such that k !  as k ! 1. We have to show that  eR(k) !  eR() as
k ! 1.
 There exists a compact set K  Rn
+ such that E(k)  K for all k 2 N suﬃciently large.
So there exists a subsequence ( eR(kj))j2N and a vector  eR 2 K such that:  eR(kj) !  eR.
Since  eR(kj) 2 E(kj), for all kj, and kj ! , we have:  eR 2 E():
 Now, let  e 2 E(). Then, for all j 2 N, there exists  ej = (e1;j; ;en;j) 2 E(kj) such that
























But this is true for all  e 2 E() then  eR coincides with  eR(), the unique normalized
equilibrium and we have:
 eR(kj) !  eR() as j ! 1:
 This is true for all convergent subsequences of  eR(k) so one can prove that this is true for
the sequence ( eR(k))k2N and at the end we obtain:
 eR(k) !  eR()ask ! 1; for allk ! 
which completes the proof.
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